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Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms of 
Schumpeterian Evolution
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Abstract
The paper extends the research program of modeling the Schumpeterian vision of 
innovative development in the framework of the Arrow-Debreu theory of general 
equilibrium. To study changes in the production sector, as well as in the whole 
economy, the concept of extension of the systems under study is introduced. It enables 
us to model the mechanisms of Schumpeterian evolution in the conceptual apparatus 
of Hurwicz’s theory of economic mechanisms. 
The paper is aimed at expanding our previous studies into two new directions. 
First, we establish the conditions sufficient for improving positions of various 
groups of agents such as producers, innovators, consumers, etc., under the price or 
qualitative mechanism regime. Second, to compare mechanisms of Schumpeterian 
evolution, we respect the logic of this process which is determined by innovative, as 
well as adaptive, equilibrium changes in the evolving economy under consideration. 
Consequently, we formulate two different criteria in our comparative analysis based, 
on the one hand, on the index of the distance between two innovative extensions of 
the given economic system and, on the other hand, on the increase in wealth of the 
given set of agents. 
The motivations of innovators, and the reason for which innovations are adopted 
into the producers’ and consumers’ plans of action, are also precisely explained in 
the paper. The results of our theoretical research can be useful in economic analyses, 
among others, in the case of the lack of the sufficient access to statistical data. 
Due to both the formal conceptual apparatus of the general equilibrium theory 
and Hurwicz’s approach to the problem of designing economic mechanisms, the 
paper takes the form of an axiomatic deductive system of mathematical theorems 
interpreted in the language of economics. 
Keywords: Schumpeterian evolution, mechanisms, designing mechanisms, Debreu 
economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Schumpeter distinguished two forms of economic life: the circular 
flow and economic development based on innovations (see Schumpeter, 
1934). The circular flow resembles the “blood circulation in a living organism” 
and is interpreted as the stagnation of economic life. Economic development, 
driven by innovators, means a spontaneous and discontinuous change in the 
channels of the circular flow and usually implies the disturbance of equilibrium. 
During economic development, two tendencies in the production sphere 
are observed: innovation creation and the elimination of existing products 
or organizational structures and their replacement by new ones. Finally, it 
moves the system back to a new stationary state, where previous innovations 
have been absorbed in an equilibrated system. The analysis of mechanisms of 
economic evolution was at the core of Joseph Schumpeter’s interest. 
The paper is aimed at expanding our previous studies into two new 
directions. First, we establish the conditions sufficient for improving positions 
of various groups of agents such as producers, innovators, consumers, etc., 
under the price or qualitative mechanism regime. Second, to compare 
mechanisms of Schumpeterian evolution, we respect the logic of this process 
which is determined by innovative, as well as adaptive, equilibrium changes 
in the evolving economy under consideration. Consequently, we suggest 
two different criteria in our comparative analysis based, on the one hand, 
on the index of the distance between two innovative extensions of the given 
economic system and, on the other hand, on the increase in wealth of the 
given set of agents. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that from the methodological viewpoint 
we go beyond the perfect rationality paradigm in our modeling, because 
economic agents are not able to perform their optimal plans of actions in 
out-of-equilibrium states. To model such stages of evolutionary process, we 
define and analyze economic systems labeled as quasi-systems. 
This paper consists of six parts. In the second part, the literature review 
is presented, while in the third part, the research method used in the paper 
is characterized. In the fourth part the basic model, namely the private 
ownership economy with almost all inactive agents, as well as various kinds 
of extensions of subsystems of the considered economy, and extensions of 
the economy as a whole, are defined. In the fourth part, the reader can also 
find the short characteristics of Hurwicz’s economic mechanisms as well 
as the comparative analysis of the innovative evolution and the adopting 
mechanisms, respectively. The fifth part is devoted to discussion, and the 
sixth part contains the conclusions. Due to the formal conceptual apparatus 
of the general equilibrium theory, as well as Hurwicz’s approach to the 
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problem of designing economic mechanisms, the paper takes the form of 
an axiomatic deductive system of mathematical theorems interpreted in the 
language of economics. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The paper extends the research program of modeling the Schumpeterian 
vision of innovative development in the Arrow-Debreu theory of general 
equilibrium (cf. Malawski, 2005, 2008; Malawski & Woerter, 2006; Ciałowicz 
& Malawski, 2011; Malawski, 2013). The core of this set-up is based on 
modeling the two fundamental forms of economic life distinguished by 
Schumpeter (1934), namely the circular flow and economic development by 
specific extensions of the production and consumption systems being the part 
of the Debreu private ownership economy, so that the analysis includes static 
as well as dynamic forms. Moreover, this research program has been recently 
combined (see Lipieta & Malawski, 2016; Lipieta, 2013) with Hurwicz’s theory 
of economic mechanism (see for instance Hurwicz & Reiter, 2006). 
At the same time, the current neo-Schumpeterian studies suggest 
(Hanusch & Pyka, 2007; Andersen, 2009) that the Schumpeterian innovative 
evolution is governed by two different kinds of mechanisms. First, 
quantitative, price mechanisms to determine the prices and quantities of 
goods in the state of Walrasian equilibrium corresponding to the circular 
flow, and, second, qualitative mechanisms typical for economic development 
explaining the role of innovations. 
Indeed, Andersen (2009) identifies two opposing evolutionary 
mechanisms: first, the mechanism of innovation which moves the economic 
system from a stationary state to its maximally disequilibrated state; Second, 
the mechanism of adaptation to move the system back to a new stationary 
state, where previous innovations have been absorbed in an equilibrated 
system of economic routines. 
Similarly, transition from the circular flow to economic development can 
be characterized as follows (Hanusch & Pyka, 2007): “It is no longer price 
competition only, but following his ideas of development, quality competition, 
driven by innovations and imitations of economic actors, takes over the 
leading role. In other words, profit opportunities are signaled not exclusively 
by market prices but also by creativity and daringness of entrepreneurial 
actors who change the relative scarcity in an economic system”. 
This analysis of Schumpeterian evolution mechanisms, presented 
above, suggests that the mechanisms under study can be classified into two 
categories: price mechanisms corresponding to circular flow and qualitative 
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mechanisms based on innovations. However, our general, more rigorous 
setting (see also Lipieta & Malawski, 2016; Lipieta, 2013) implies that it is 
difficult to preserve this dichotomy and a variety of economic mechanisms 
should be taken into account. The main premise in this context is based on 
our viewpoint that the consequences of innovative changes contribute to 
more diversified results. Specifically, this variety of qualitative mechanisms 
concerns the agents whose positions get better off. Thus we can distinguish 
qualitative mechanism with respect to the given set of agents, for example, 
the set of innovators or all producers. 
RESEARCH METHOD
The axiomatic method is the main method used in the paper. The axiomatic 
method in economy was initiated in the 1930s, during the studies on the 
problem of the existence of the Walras equilibrium, especially by Wald and 
Neumann. After that, the axiomatic method appeared respective, natural and 
useful, especially in theoretical economics. Using the rationality assumption 
of behavior of economic agents and the principle ceteris paribus, it lets 
us isolate the objects under study from the rest of the world. We can find 
axiomatic models in, for instance, the theory of general equilibrium, social 
choice theory, and the theory of mechanism design. These theoretical models 
play an important role also in empirical economics, indicating the objects and 
variables worth being empirically verified. 
Generally, we can say that the mathematical methods play the role of 
mental experiments to allow us the analysis of economic processes. Some of 
our results have the form of theorems with rigorous proofs. 
ANALYSIS
The private ownership economy with almost all inactive agents
In the process of evolution of an economy, some agents can enter or exit 
the market. Hence, in modeling the structure of Schumpeterian evolution, 
it is convenient to consider the economy with a countable number of agents 
(compare to Lipieta, 2013). Firstly, the production sector of the economy will 
be defined. Let
 • 𝐵 = (𝑏
𝑗
)
𝑗∈ℕ
 - be a countable set of producers, 
 • 𝑦: 𝐵 ∋ 𝑏
𝑗
 → 𝑌𝑏𝑗 ⊂ ℝℓ - be a correspondence of production sets, which to 
every producer 𝑏
𝑗
 assigns a non-empty production set 𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) =  𝑌𝑏𝑗 ⊂ ℝℓ 
of the producer’s feasible production plans, where 
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∃ 𝑛 ∈ ℕ ∀𝑗 > 𝑛  𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) ≝ {0},
 • 𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ be a price vector. 
Definition 1. The two-range relational system 
𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 ,ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ),
is called the quasi-production system. The producer 𝑏
𝑗
 for which 𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) =  {0} is 
called the inactive producer, while the producer for which 𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) ≠ {0} is called 
the active one. 
The idea of the set of inactive agents simplifies comparing changes in 
the system under study at different points of time. Especially, it enables us 
to consider the potential future producers in the initial system 𝑃
𝑞
 as well as 
the producers which will stop, after some time, their activities in the market. 
 
Definition 2. If 𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 ,ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ) is the quasi-production system in which for 
given price vector 𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ
∀ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 𝜂𝑏 (𝑝 ) ≝ {𝑦𝑏∗ ∈ 𝑌𝑏 :  𝑝 ∘ 𝑦 𝑏∗ =  max{𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏 :  𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑌𝑏}} ≠ ∅,
then 
 • 𝜂: 𝐵 ∋ 𝑏 → 𝜂𝑏(𝑝 ) ⊂ ℝℓ is called the correspondence of supply at price system 𝑝 ,
 • 𝜋: 𝐵 ∋ 𝑏 → 𝜋(𝑏) = 𝑝 ∘ 𝑦 𝑏∗ ∈ ℝ is called the maximal profit function at 
price system 𝑝 , where 𝑦𝑏∗ ∈ 𝜂𝑏(𝑝 ) for every 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ,
 • the quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
 is called the production system and denoted by 
𝑃
𝑞
 =  𝑃 = (𝐵 ,ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ,𝜂,𝜋). 
Every element 𝑦𝑏∗ of the set 𝜂𝑏(𝑝 ) is called the optimal plan of producer 𝑏. 
The “quasi-type” of production systems enables us to model the 
production sector of an economy under a bounded rationality assumption. 
This is because, in the quasi-production system, the aims of producers are 
not specified in contrast to the production system (compare to Def. 1 and 2), 
where producers maximize profits at given prices and technologies. Hence, 
to keep up the spirit of Schumpeterian thinking, innovations and structural 
changes of the production sector of an economy are modeled in the quasi-
production systems (compare to Lipieta, 2013). 
Similarly, a quasi-consumption system is defined. Let 
 • 𝐴 = (𝑎
𝑖
)
𝑖∈ℕ
 be a countable set of consumers, 
 • 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ⊂ ℝℓ × ℝℓ be the family of all preference relations in ℝℓ,
 • 𝜒: 𝐴 ∋ 𝑎
𝑖
 → 𝜒(𝑎
𝑖
) =  𝑋𝑎𝑖 ⊂ ℝℓ be a correspondence of consumptions sets 
which to every consumer 𝑎
𝑖
 assigns a nonempty consumption set
𝜒(𝑎
𝑖
) =  𝑋𝑎𝑖 being a subset of the commodity space ℝℓ and representing 
the consumer’s feasible consumption plans with respect to his 
psycho-physical structure; moreover 
∃ 𝑚 ∈ ℕ ∀𝑖 > 𝑚  𝜒(𝑎
𝑖
) ≝ {0}, 
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 • 𝜖: 𝐴 ∋ 𝑎
𝑖
 → 𝜖(𝑎
𝑖
) ∈ 𝜒(𝑎
𝑖
) be an initial endowment mapping, 
 • 𝜀 ⊂ 𝐴 × (ℝℓ × ℝℓ) be a correspondence, which to every consumer
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 assigns a preference relation ≼
𝑎
 from set 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓  restricted to set
𝜒(𝑎) × 𝜒(𝑎),
 • 𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ be a price vector. 
Definition 3. The three-range relational system
𝐶
𝑞
 =  (𝐴 , ℝℓ ,𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ; 𝜒,𝜖,𝜀 ,𝑝 )
is called the quasi-consumption system. The consumer 𝑎
𝑖
 for which 
𝜒(𝑎𝑖) =  {0} is called the inactive consumer, while the consumer for which 
𝜒(𝑎𝑖) ≠ {0} is called the active one. 
Definition 4. If 𝐶
𝑞
 =  (𝐴 , ℝℓ, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ; 𝜒,𝑒,𝜀 ,𝑝 ) is the quasi-consumption system in 
which for price vector 𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ and for every 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝜒(𝑎): 𝑝 ∘  𝑥 ≤ 𝑝 ∘  𝑒(𝑎)} ≠ ∅. 
𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) = {𝑥 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝛽(𝑎): ∀𝑥 𝑎 ∈ 𝛽(𝑎) 𝑥 𝑎 ≼
𝑎
 𝑥 𝑎∗, ≼ 
𝑎
 ∈ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 } ≠ ∅,
then 
 • 𝛽: 𝐴 ∋ 𝑎 → 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) ⊂ ℝℓ is the correspondence of budget sets at price 
system 𝑝 ,
 • 𝜑: 𝐴 ∋ 𝑎 → 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) ⊂ ℝℓ is the demand correspondence at price system 𝑝 ,
 • the quasi-consumption system 𝐶
𝑞
 is called the consumption system 
and denoted by 𝐶 = (𝐴 , ℝℓ ,𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ; 𝜒,𝑒,𝜀 ,𝑝 ,𝛽,𝜑). 
Every element 𝑥 𝑎∗ of the set 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) is called the optimal plan of consumer 𝑎. 
The “quasi-type” of consumption system allows a situation where there is 
no upper bound on the budget set for the preference relation of a consumer. 
However, we assume, according to the rationality assumption, that if there is 
a consumption plan maximizing the preference relation of consumer 𝑎 on his 
budget set, then consumer 𝑎 just realizes his best plan (one of his best plans). 
Now, we can assume the following definition: 
Definition 5. The relational system 
ℇ
𝑞
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃
𝑞
 ,𝐶
𝑞
 ,𝜃,𝜔)
where 
 • 𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 , ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ) is the quasi-production system, 
 • the mapping 𝜃: 𝐴 × 𝐵  → [0,1] satisfies 
𝜃(𝑎
𝑖
 ,𝑏
𝑗
) =  0 if 𝑖 > 𝑚 or 𝑗 > 𝑛 , ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
𝜃(𝑎,𝑏) = 1, 
 • 𝐶
𝑞
 =  (𝐴 , ℝℓ , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ; 𝜒, 𝜖, 𝜀 , 𝑝 ) is the quasi-consumption system, 
 • 𝜖(𝑎
𝑖
) ∈ ℝℓ for 𝑖 ∈ ℕ, 𝜖(𝑎
𝑖
) ≝ 0 ∈ ℝℓ for 𝑖 > 𝑚 , 
∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
𝜖(𝑎) =  𝜔 
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is called the private ownership economy with almost all inactive agents. If 𝑃
𝑞
is the production system (𝑃
𝑞
 =  𝑃) and 𝐶
𝑞
 is the consumption system (𝐶
𝑞
 =  𝐶), 
then the private ownership economy with almost all inactive agents ℇ
𝑞
 will be 
called the Debreu economy. 
If ℇ
𝑞
 is the Debreu economy, then it will be denoted by ℇ
𝑞
 =  ℇ
𝑝 
 where ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃,𝐶,𝜃,𝜔). 
The private ownership economy with almost all inactive agents operates 
as follows. Let a price vector 𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ be given. Every active producer 𝑏 realizes 
a production plan 𝑦̃𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏). It is assumed that every inactive producer 𝑏
𝑗
realizes plan ?̃? 𝑏𝑗 =  0 ∈ ℝℓ (his activity is reduced to zero production plan). The 
profit of each producer 𝑏, by realization of the plan 𝑦̃𝑏 , is divided among all 
consumers according to function 𝜃. Hence, the expenditure (wealth) of every 
consumer 𝑎 cannot be greater than the value 
𝑤(𝑎) =  𝑝  ∘ 𝜖(𝑎)+∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝜃(𝑎,𝑏)∙ 𝑝 ∘ 𝑦̃𝑏 .  
So the budget set of every consumer 𝑎 at price system 𝑝  is of the form 
𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝜒(𝑎): 𝑝 ∘  𝑥 ≤ 𝑤(𝑎)}. 
In this situation, if 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) ≠ ∅ and 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) ≠ ∅ at given price system 𝑝  (see Def. 
4), then consumer 𝑎 chooses his consumption plan 𝑥 ̃𝑎 =  𝑥 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) ⊂ 𝜒(𝑎) 
maximizing his preference on the budget set 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ). 
If 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) ≠ ∅ and 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) = ∅, then consumer 𝑎 chooses his consumption plan
𝑥 ̃𝑎 ∈ 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ), due to his own criterion. If 𝛽𝑎(𝑝 ) = ∅, then we assume that 
𝑥 ̃𝑎 =  0 ∈ ℝℓ. As above, it is assumed that every inactive consumer realizes plan 
𝑥 ̃𝑎𝑖 =  0 ∈ ℝℓ for 𝑖 > 𝑚 . 
Consider the Debreu economy ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃,𝐶,𝜃,𝜔). Let 𝑥 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) for every 
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 as well as 𝑦𝑏∗ ∈ 𝜂𝑏(𝑝 ) for every 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 . If 
∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
𝑥 𝑎∗ − ∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝑦𝑏∗ =  𝜔,
then the sequence 
((𝑥 𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 ,
(𝑦𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ,𝑝 )),
where (𝑥 𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ≝ (𝑥 𝑎¹∗, … , 𝑥 𝑎𝑚 ∗ ,0,0,…) and (𝑦𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ≝ (𝑦𝑏¹∗, … ,𝑦𝑏𝑛 ∗ ,0,0, …) is called 
the state of the Walras equilibrium in economy ℇ
𝑝 
. 
Extensions of the private ownership economies 
To study changes in the economies, we will examine the concept of extensions 
of production and consumption systems respectively, as well as the economy 
as a whole (see also Lipieta, 2013). 
(1)
(2)
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Consider a quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 ,ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ) in the fixed point 
of time 𝑡 = 0. Assuming that system 𝑃
𝑞
 evolves, after a certain time in the 
point 𝑡 = 1, the components (see Def. 2.1) of system 𝑃
𝑞
 can be transformed 
into the components of a quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ =  (𝐵 ′ ,ℝℓ′ ;𝑦′ ,𝑝 ′), 
where additionally 𝑏
𝑗
 = 𝑏
𝑗
′ for every 𝑗 ∈ {1,…,max{𝑛 ,𝑛 ′}}. That will be noted by 
𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′. The quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ will be called the transformation of 
the system 𝑃
𝑞
 on the time interval [0,1].
If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′ and an active producer 𝑏
𝑗
 from system 𝑃
𝑞
 stops his activity on 
the market in the observable time interval, then he will become the inactive 
producer in the system 𝑃
𝑞
′. Hence for producer 𝑏
𝑗
, 
𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) ≠ {0} and  𝑦′(𝑏
𝑗
) =  {0}
Similarly, if an active producer 𝑏
𝑗
 appears in the system 𝑃
𝑞
′ which is the 
transformation of system 𝑃
𝑞
, then he is considered as the inactive producer 
in the system 𝑃
𝑞
 , formally 
𝑦(𝑏
𝑗
) =  {0} and 𝑦′(𝑏
𝑗
) ≠ {0}.  
Notice that inactive agents, in fact, do not influence on actions of active 
producers on the market. Hence if 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′ , then without loss of generality 
we can assume that 𝑏
𝑗
 =  𝑏
𝑗
′ for every 𝑗 ∈ {max {𝑛 ,𝑛 ′} +1, … }. Hence, we assume 
that 𝐵 = 𝐵 ′. 
In a given transformation of the given quasi-production system, we 
model the improvement in the producers’ position (compare to Def. 4. 
20 in Lipieta, 2013). Namely, if 𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 ,ℝℓ ;𝑦,𝑝 ) and 𝑃
𝑞
′ =  (𝐵 ′ ,ℝℓ′ ;𝑦′ ,𝑝 ′) are 
the quasi-production systems where 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′, then we say that a producer 
𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 = 𝐵 ′ is better off in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ than in system 𝑃
𝑞
 if and only if, 
∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏) ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) 𝑝  ∘ 𝑦𝑏 < 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦 ′𝑏 . 
In the same way, as in case of quasi-production systems, we define 
and note down the transformation of quasi-consumption systems as 
well as private ownership economies with almost all inactive agents. 
Analogously, if 𝐶
𝑞
 =  (𝐴 ,ℝℓ ,𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ; 𝜒,𝜖,𝜀 ,𝑝 ) and (𝐴 ′, ℝℓ′, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ′ ;𝜒′, 𝜖′, 𝜀 ′, 𝑝 ′) are the 
quasi-consumption systems where 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝐶
𝑞
′ , then we say that a consumer 
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 =  𝐴 ′ is better off in system 𝐶
 𝑞
′ than in system 𝐶
𝑞
 if and only if, 
∃𝑥 ′𝑎 ∈ 𝜒′(𝑎) ∀𝑥 𝑎 ∈ 𝜒(𝑎): [(proj
ℝℓ
 (𝑥 ′𝑎) ∈ 𝜒(𝑎)) ∧ (𝑥 𝑎 ≺
𝑎
 proj
ℝ ℓ
(𝑥 ′𝑎))]. 
If ℇ
𝑞
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃
𝑞
 ,𝐶
𝑞
 ,𝜃,𝜔) and ℇ′
𝑞
 = (ℝℓ′ ,𝑃
𝑞
′ ,𝐶
𝑞
′ ,𝜃′ ,𝜔 ′) are the private 
ownership economies with almost all inactive agent, where 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′ and 
𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝐶
𝑞
′ on the same time interval [0,1], then we will say that economy ℇ
𝑞
′ is 
the transformation of economy ℇ
𝑞
 and note down ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′. 
(3)
(4)
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As it was emphasized before, to model and compare some changes in 
the economy under study, various kinds of extensions of adequate systems 
will be defined. In the below definitions, the natural projection from space 
ℝℓ′ on space ℝℓ , namely mapping 
proj
ℝℓ
:  ℝℓ ′ ∋ (𝑥 
1
 , … ,𝑥 
ℓ ′
) → (𝑥 
1
, … ,𝑥 
ℓ
 )∈ ℝℓ 
for ℓ,ℓ′ ∈ {1,2, …}, ℓ ≤  ℓ′, is involved. 
Let 𝑃
𝑞
 =  (𝐵 ,ℝ ℓ ;y,𝑝 ), 𝑃
𝑞
′ =  (𝐵 ′ ,ℝℓ′ ;y′, 𝑝 ′) be the quasi-production systems and 
𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝑃
𝑞
′. Under the above notations, the following definition is formulated. 
Definition 6. The quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ is called the cumulative 
extension of the quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
, in short 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′, if
1. ℓ ≤  ℓ′,
2. 𝑝 ≤ proj
ℝℓ
(𝑝 ′),
3. ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 𝑦(𝑏) ⊂ proj
ℝℓ
 (𝑦′(𝑏)),
4. ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏) 𝑝  ∘ 𝑦𝑏 ≤  𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏. 
If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′, then the quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ is said to be the strong 
cumulative extension of quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
 (𝑃
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′), with respect 
to the profit, if and only if, 
∃𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏) ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) 𝑝  ∘ 𝑦𝑏 < 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏,
Notice that if 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′ and ℓ= ℓ′ (then the natural projections are identity 
mappings), then neither new firms nor commodities appear and the old ones 
are not eliminated from the production process. The old technologies are still 
used (condition 3 by Def. 6) with non-decreasing prices (condition 2 by Def. 
6), which result in not less profit (condition 4 by Def. 6). Hence, the idea of 
the cumulative extension of the quasi production system, where ℓ =  ℓ ′ can 
be interpreted as the mathematical model of the Schumpeterian circular flow 
in the production sphere (compare to Schumpeter, 1934 and Lipieta, 2013). If 
ℓ < ℓ′, then new commodities appear on the market. Moreover, if 
𝑦(𝑏) =  {0} and 𝑦′(𝑏) ≠ {0} for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 , then producer 𝑏 enters the market, if 
𝑦(𝑏) ≠ {0} and 𝑦′(𝑏) =  {0}, then producer 𝑏 exits the market. 
The strong version of the cumulative extension of a production system 
with respect to its given component is defined to model and express 
substantial changes in the production sector (compare to Malawski, 2013). 
We start now the analysis of the Schumpeterian economic development 
from definitions of innovations and innovative changes. The innovation is 
a new commodity or a new technology introduced into the economy. The 
innovator is the producer who introduces an innovation. Consequently, 
introducing a new commodity or a new technology into the production sector 
of an economy are called the innovative changes in the production sector (of 
the economy) or, simply, in that economy. To model the innovative changes 
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in the production sector, the innovative extension of a production system is 
defined (compare to Lipieta, 2013). 
Definition 7. The quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ is called the innovative 
extension of the quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
, in short 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖  
𝑃
𝑞
′, if 
1. ℓ ≤  ℓ′,
2. ℓ =  ℓ′ ⟹ ∃ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏)\ ⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
 𝑦(𝑏)∶ 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏 > 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦𝑏,
3. ℓ < ℓ′ ⟹ ∃ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈𝑦′ (𝑏)\ (⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
 (𝑦(𝑏) × {0} ×…×{0})):  
𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏 > proj
ℝℓ
(𝑝 ′) ∘ 𝑦𝑏
The producer satisfying condition 2 or 3 (by Def. 7) adequately, is called the 
innovator. If producer 𝑏 is the innovator then the vectors 𝑦′𝑏 are called (his) 
innovative plans. 
The set of innovators will be denoted by 𝐵 
𝑖𝑛 
. 
If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ where ℓ =  ℓ′, then innovations are reduced to the implementation 
of new technology into production without introducing a new commodity. 
Condition 2 by Definition 7 means that every innovator 𝑏 in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ can 
realize the innovative plan 𝑦′𝑏 which guarantees him a higher profit at prices 
determined in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ than any of his plan 𝑦𝑏 realized in system 𝑃
𝑞
. If 
𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ and ℓ < ℓ′, than a new commodity is introduced by an innovator and every 
innovator introduces new technology into the production sphere (condition 
3 by Def. 7). The innovative plan 𝑦′𝑏 carried out by innovator 𝑏 in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ 
gives him also more profit then any plan 𝑦𝑏 realized by him in system 𝑃
𝑞
 but at 
respective prices taken from system 𝑃
𝑞
′. We assume, following Schumpeterian 
thinking, that producers’ aim is to increase the profits and it motivates them 
to introduce innovations. Hence, if 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′, then every innovator in system 
𝑃
𝑞
′ realizes such plan, which gives him a higher profit than by realizing plans 
feasible so far, that is one of his innovative plans. Consequently, if 𝑃
𝑞
′ is the 
production system (𝑃
𝑞
′ =  𝑃′), then every innovator 𝑏 realizes some plan 𝑦′𝑏 
satisfying condition 2 or 3 (by Def. 7) respectively, and it has to be one of his 
optimal plans. Moreover, the set 𝜂′𝑏(𝑝 ), for every 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 
𝑖𝑛 
, consists only of optimal 
plans of producer 𝑏. As a results, if ℇ
𝑞
 =  (ℝℓ, 𝑃
𝑞
, 𝐶
𝑞
, 𝜃,𝜔) and ℇ
𝑞
′ =  (ℝℓ′ ,𝑃
𝑞
′ ,𝐶
𝑞
′, 𝜃′ ,𝜔 ′)
are the private ownership economies with almost all inactive agent, where 𝑃
𝑞
 
⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′, 𝑃
𝑞
′ = 𝑃′ as well as ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′, then the state of equilibrium (see (2)) if existed, 
in economy ℇ
𝑞
′ contains on the coordinate proper for innovator 𝑏, one of his 
innovative plan which gives him maximal profit. 
If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ and 𝑃
𝑞
 is the production system (𝑃
𝑞
 =  𝑃), then by conditions 2 
and 3 by Definition 7, it follows that 
∀ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 
𝑖𝑛 
 ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏) \ ⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝑦(𝑏): ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏 > 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦𝑏 if ℓ =  ℓ′
or
∀ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 
𝑖𝑛 
 ∃𝑦′𝑏 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏) \ ⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
(𝑦(𝑏) × {0} ×…× {0}): ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏): 
𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏 > proj 
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′) ∘ 𝑦𝑏 if ℓ < ℓ′,
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The above conditions mean that if 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ and 𝑃
𝑞
 is the production system, 
then every innovator 𝑏 in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ gets, by realization one of his innovative 
plans 𝑦′𝑏, the profit higher than profit obtained by realization any of his plans 
from system 𝑃
𝑞
 at respective prices from system 𝑃
𝑞
′. Hence the innovators are 
better off in the system 𝑃
𝑞
′ than in the system 𝑃
𝑞
 in the sense of condition (3). 
Hence if 𝑝 = proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′), then the innovators are better off in the system 𝑃
𝑞
′ 
than in the system 𝑃
𝑞
 in the sense of condition (3). 
The innovator 𝑏
0
, for whom 
∃𝑦′𝑏0 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏
0
) \ ⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝑦(𝑏) ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏) 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏0 > 𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦𝑏 if ℓ =  ℓ′
or 
∃𝑦′𝑏0 ∈ 𝑦′(𝑏
0
) \ ⋃
𝑏∈𝐵 
 (𝑦(𝑏) × {0} ×…× {0}) ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∀𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑦(𝑏)
𝑝 ′ ∘ 𝑦′𝑏0 > proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′) ∘ 𝑦𝑏   if   ℓ < ℓ′. 
is called the leading innovator, the market leader or shortly the leader. If 
𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ as well as one of the above condition is satisfied, then there is at least 
one innovator 𝑏 in system 𝑃
𝑞
′ who gains, by realization one of his innovative 
plans 𝑦′𝑏 , the profit higher than profits of all producers from system 𝑃
𝑞
, 
determined at respective prices taken from system 𝑃
𝑞
′.
The leaders can also appear in quasi-production systems but if there is 
a producer in system 𝑃
𝑞
 for whom the maximal profit does not exist, then no 
leader will appear in system 𝑃
𝑞
′. If 𝑃
𝑞
′ is the production system (𝑃
𝑞
′ =  𝑃′), then 
there is at least one market leader in system 𝑃
𝑞
′. 
Let us notice that if the quasi-production system 𝑃
𝑞
′ is the cumulative 
extension of the production system 𝑃
𝑞
 (𝑃
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′) with respect to the profit, 
then 𝑃
𝑞
′ can be also the innovative extension of 𝑃
𝑞
 (𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′). 
Similarly, and for the same reasons as in case of the production sector, 
we define extensions of the quasi-consumption system. Let 𝐶
𝑞
 =  (𝐴 ,ℝℓ ,𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ;
𝜒,𝑒,𝜀 ,𝑝 ), 𝐶
𝑞
′ =  (𝐴 ′, ℝℓ′, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 ′ ;𝜒′, 𝑒′, 𝜀 ′, 𝑝 ′) be the quasi-consumption systems 
and 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂ 𝐶
𝑞
′.
Definition 8. The quasi-consumption system 𝐶
𝑞
′ is said to be the cumulative 
extension of the quasi-consumption system 𝐶
𝑞
, in short 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′, if
1. ℓ ≤  ℓ′,
2. 𝑝 ≤ proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′),
3. 𝐴 = 𝐴 ′,
4. ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 𝜒(𝑎) ⊂ proj
ℝℓ 
(𝜒′(𝑎)),
5. ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 𝑒(𝑎) ≤ proj
ℝℓ
 (𝑒′(𝑎)),
6. ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 𝜀 (𝑎) ⊂ proj
ℝℓ
 (𝜀 ′(𝑎)),
7. ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ∀𝑥 𝑎 ∈ 𝜒(𝑎) ∃𝑥 ′𝑎 ∈𝜒′(𝑎) proj
ℝℓ
 (𝑥 ′𝑎) ∈ 𝜒(𝑎) ∧ 𝑥 𝑎 ≼
𝑎
 proj
ℝℓ
(𝑥 ′𝑎).  
The cumulative extension 𝐶
𝑞
′ is the strong cumulative extension (𝐶
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′) of 
the quasi-consumption system 𝐶
𝑞
, with respect to the demand ⟺ 
∃𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ∃𝑥 ′𝑎 ∈ 𝜒′(𝑎) [(𝑝 𝑟𝑜𝑗
ℝℓ(𝑥 ′
𝑎) ∈ 𝜒(𝑎)) ∧ (∀𝑥 𝑎 ∈ 𝜒(𝑎) 𝑥 𝑎 ≺
𝑎
 proj
ℝℓ(𝑥 ′
𝑎))]. 
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The complete definition of the strong cumulative extensions of the quasi-
consumption system due to other criterions, the reader can find, for instance 
in (Malawski, 2013).
Let ℇ
𝑞
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃
𝑞
, 𝐶
𝑞
, 𝜃, 𝜔) and ℇ
𝑞
′ =  (ℝℓ′, 𝑃
𝑞
′, 𝐶
𝑞
′, 𝜃′, 𝜔′) be the private 
ownership economies with almost all inactive agents. Let ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′.  On the 
basis of the above definitions, we put the following:
Definition 9. The economy ℇ
𝑞
′ is said to be the cumulative extension of the 
ℇ
𝑞
, in short ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 ℇ
𝑞
′, if
1. 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′,
2. 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′,
3. 𝜔 ≤ 𝜔′. 
If ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 ℇ
𝑞
′ and 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′ or 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′, then economy ℇ
𝑞
′ is said to be the strong 
cumulative extension of economy ℇ
𝑞
, in short ℇ
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 ℇ
𝑞
′. 
If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′ then economy ℇ
𝑞
′ is the innovative extension of economy ℇ
𝑞
, in 
short ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
. 
Mechanisms connected to evolutions of the private ownership economies 
In this part of the paper, some definitions useful for modeling the structure of 
Schumpeterian evolution mechanisms will be formulated. 
Let 𝐸 ≠ ∅ be the set of environments, namely elements that constrain 
the situation of economic agents (see Hurwicz, Reiter, 2006; Jordan 1982). 
The set of desired outcomes (the outcome sets) is denoted by 𝑍 (𝑍 ≠ ∅). 
It is assumed that the economic agents can communicate by sending and 
retrieving messages that are necessary for achieving goals. 
 
Definition 10. (Hurwicz, Reiter, 2006). The triple 𝛤 = (𝑀,𝜇,ℎ), where 
 • 𝑀 ≠ ∅ is the message space, 
 • 𝜇: 𝐸 → 𝑀 is the message correspondence, 
 • ℎ:  𝑀 → 𝑍  is the outcome function 
is called the economic mechanism. 
It is said that an economic mechanism 𝛤 = (𝑀,𝜇,ℎ) realizes the goal function 
(or correspondence) 𝐹: 𝐸 → 𝑍  if 
∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 ℎ(𝜇(𝑒)) ⊂ 𝐹(𝑒). 
Now, we will distinguish two classes of mechanisms, price and qualitative 
mechanisms. 
Definition 11 (Lipieta, 2013). An economic mechanism, in which the prices 
of commodities are elements of the message space which will be called the 
price mechanism. 
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An economic mechanism, in the consequence of which the position of at 
least one agent from a subset of the set of all agents will be better off in the 
sense of conditions (3) and (4), without making the position of the rest of the 
agents from the subset worse off, will be called the qualitative mechanism 
with respect to this subset. 
Now let us focus on the structure of evolution of the economy under 
study. At the beginning, we consider the Debreu economy ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃,𝐶,𝜃,𝜔)
in which a state of equilibrium exists. According to Schumpeterian ideas (see 
Schumpeter, 1934) economy ℇ
𝑝 
 evolves for a certain time, in the direction 
to its modified form that is its innovative extension ℇ
𝑝 
′ = (ℝℓ′, 𝑃′, 𝐶′, 𝜃′, 𝜔′ ). 
Hence ℇ
𝑝 
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑝 
′ . The final economy ℇ
𝑝 
′ should also be the Debreu economy in 
equilibrium. In the meantime, some agents might enter or exit the economy, 
the producers can change their technologies, some innovations can be 
introduced into the market, the consumption sets and the budget sets might 
be verified as well as the producers’ and consumers’ optimal plans can be 
changed. In some cases, the producers do not maximize their profits or the 
consumers do not manage to maximize their preferences, etc. All of that 
becomes the basis for our modeling. 
It should be emphasized that the expected increase in the profits 
motivates innovators to modifying their technologies. 
Let ℇ
𝑞
 be the private ownership economy. By ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 ), for every 𝑡 ∈ (0,1]
we will denote the transformation of the economy ℇ
𝑞
 at point of time 𝑡 , 
defined in the same way as for 𝑡 = 1. The above dependence will be denotes 
as above, namely ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 ). The set 𝔼
𝑞
(ℇ
𝑞
) stands for the set of all possible 
transformations of economy ℇ
𝑞
 on the time interval (0,1], namely 
𝔼
𝑞
(ℇ
𝑞
) =  {ℇ
𝑞
(𝑡 ): ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 ) ∧ 𝑡 ∈ (0,1]}. 
Let points of time 𝑡 
0
, 𝑡 
1
, … ,𝑡 
𝑆
 satisfying 0 =  𝑡 
0
 < 𝑡 
1
 < ⋯ <𝑡 
𝑆
 =  1 for some 
𝑆 ∈ {1,2,…} be all the points of changes in economic activity of producers or 
consumers. 
Definition 12. The mapping 𝑇: [0,1] → 𝔼
𝑞
(ℇ
𝑞
) satisfying 
𝑇(0) = ℇ
𝑞
, 𝑇(1) = ℇ
𝑞
′(1) =  ℇ
𝑞
′, 𝑇(𝑡 ) =  ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 
𝑠
) for 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡 
𝑠−1
, 𝑡 
𝑠
) for 𝑠 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑆}
is called the transition from the economy ℇ
𝑞
 to the economy ℇ
𝑞
′.
If additionally ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′ then transition 𝑇 is called the innovative evolution of 
economy ℇ
𝑞
.
The interval [0,1] is interpreted as the time of evolution of economy ℇ
𝑞
 
to economy ℇ
𝑞
′.
Theorem 1 If ℇ
𝑞
 and ℇ
𝑞
′ are private ownership economies with almost all 
inactive agents, then the transition 𝑇 from economy ℇ
𝑞
 to economy ℇ
𝑞
′, is the 
price mechanism. 
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Proof. Let 𝐾 = {𝑎
1
, 𝑏
1
, 𝑎
2
, 𝑏
2
,…} be the set of agents. The environment of every 
agent 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  in this situation is determined by the characteristics of that agent 
in economy ℇ
𝑞
. Hence it is of the form: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝ �
(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), {0}, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0)                     if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, {0},𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. 
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝ �
(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), {0}, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0)                            if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′, {0},𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�        if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. 
Hence the set of environments 𝐸 𝑘  of every agent 𝑘  and the set of environments 
𝐸  are given by 
𝐸 𝑘  =  ℝℓ × 𝑃(ℝℓ) × 𝑃(ℝℓ) × ℝℓ ×𝑃(ℝ2ℓ) × ℱ(𝐵 ,[0,1]),
𝐸 ≝ 𝐸 𝑘 1 × 𝐸 𝑘 2 ×… ,
where 
ℱ(𝐵 , [0,1]) = {𝑓 : 𝐵 → [0,1]}, 𝑓 
0
 ∈ ℱ(𝐵 , [0,1]),𝑓 
0
 ≡ 0
Put
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝ �
(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), {0}, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0)                     if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, {0},𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. 
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝ �
(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), {0}, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0)                            if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′, {0},𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�        if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�    if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. 
and consequently 
𝑍 𝑘  =  ℝℓ′ × 𝑃(ℝℓ′) × 𝑃(ℝℓ′) × ℝℓ′ × 𝑃(ℝ2ℓ′) × ℱ(𝐵 , [0,1]). 
The logic structure of action of economy ℇ
𝑞
 implies that
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, 0, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0�                           if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′, 0, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 , 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�       if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 , 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�   if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘� ≝ �
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘.
as well as 𝜇𝑘 :  𝐸 𝑘  → 𝑀, for every agent 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , is given by 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≝
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, 0, 0, {∅},𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0�                           if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′, 0, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 , 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�       if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 , 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘), 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘),𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,∙)�   if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘� ≝ �
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘\𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if   𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴\𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
⋃ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋′𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  if  𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘.
Now we get that 
𝑀𝑘  =  ℝℓ′ × ℝℓ′ × ℝℓ′ × ℝℓ′ × ℝ2ℓ′ × ℱ(𝐵 , [0,1]), 𝑀 ≝ 𝑀𝑘 1 × 𝑀𝑘 2 ×…. 
Defining message correspondence 𝜇: 𝐸 → 𝑀 by the rule
𝜇(𝑒) ≝ 𝑋
𝑘 ∈𝐾 
𝜇𝑘 (𝑒𝑘 )
and the outcome function ℎ:  𝑀 → 𝑍 
ℎ:  𝑀 → 𝑍 , ℎ ≝ 𝑖𝑑
𝑀
, 
(6)
(5)
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we get that the transition from economy ℇ
𝑞
 to economy ℇ
𝑞
′ is the privacy 
preserving price mechanism realizing the goal correspondence 
𝐹: 𝐸 ∋ (𝑒1, 𝑒2 , …) → {(𝑧1, 𝑧2 , …)} ∈ 𝑍 ,
with the set of outcomes 𝑍 . The components of the environments {𝑧𝑘 }
𝑘 ∈𝐾 
form 
the economy ℇ
𝑞
′ which gives the results. 
A similar reasoning leads us to the theorems which give the conditions 
sufficient for the price mechanism 𝑇 to be a suitable qualitative mechanism. 
 
Theorem 2. Let ℇ
𝑞
 and ℇ
𝑞
′ be the private ownership economies with almost 
all inactive agents, ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′. 
1. If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 𝑃
𝑞
′, 𝑝 = proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′) and 𝑃
𝑞
′ =  𝑃′, then the price mechanism 𝑇 is also the 
qualitative mechanism with respect to the set of innovators, 
2. If 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′ with respect to the profit and 𝑃
𝑞
′ =  𝑃′, then the price mechanism 
𝑇 is the qualitative mechanism with respect to the set of all producers, 
3. If 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′ with respect to the demand and 𝐶
𝑞
′ = 𝐶′ , then the price mechanism 
𝑇 is the qualitative mechanism with respect to the set of all consumers. 
On the basis of theorems 1 and 2 we get the following: 
Theorem 3. Let ℇ
𝑞
, ℇ
𝑞
′ be the private ownership economies with almost all 
inactive agents, ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂ ℇ
𝑞
′ as well as ℇ
𝑞
′ =  ℇ
𝑝 
′.
1. If ℇ
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 ℇ
𝑞
′, where 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′ with respect to the demand or 𝑃
𝑞
 ⊊
𝑐
 𝑃
𝑞
′ with 
respect to the profit, then the price mechanism 𝑇 is also the qualitative 
mechanism with respect to the set of all agents. 
2. If ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′ and 𝑝 = proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′), then the price mechanism 𝑇 is also the 
qualitative mechanism with respect to the set of innovators. 
3. If ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′, 𝑝 = proj
ℝℓ 
(𝑝 ′) as well as 𝐶
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑐
 𝐶
𝑞
′, then the price mechanism 𝑇 is 
also the qualitative mechanism with respect to the set consisted of consumers 
and innovators. 
Comparative analysis of mechanisms of evolutions of the Debreu economy 
To compare possible innovative evolutions of the Debreu economy, we define 
the index of innovativeness of a possible transformation of the economy under 
study. It relies on comparing states of equilibrium in the adequate economies. 
Let ℇ
𝑞
 =  (ℝℓ, 𝑃
𝑞
, 𝐶
𝑞
, 𝜃, 𝜔) and ℇ
𝑞
′ =  (ℝℓ′, 𝑃
𝑞
′, 𝐶
𝑞
′, 𝜃′, 𝜔′) be the private 
ownership economies with almost all inactive agents. First we determine the 
distance between the allocations in economies ℇ
𝑞
 and ℇ
𝑞
′. Let us recall that if 
a producer 𝑏
𝑗
, for 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,…,𝑛 }, will exit the market in point of time 𝑡 ∈ (0,1], 
then 𝑦′(𝑏
𝑗
) =  {0} and consequently 𝑦′𝑏𝑗 =  0 ∈ ℝ ℓ′.  Similarly, if a producer 𝑏
𝑗
, for 
𝑗 > 𝑛 , enter the market in point 𝑡 ∈ (0,1], then we put 𝑦𝑏𝑗 = 0. Under the above 
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assumptions, for 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ≝ {1,2, … ,𝑚 𝑎𝑥 {𝑛 ,𝑛 ′}} the distance between vectors 𝑦𝑏𝑗
and 𝑦′𝑏𝑗, is defined b
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗; 𝑦𝑦′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘{1,2,… ,ℓ} {|𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗|}   if    ℓ = ℓ′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗;  𝑦𝑦′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗) =
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘{1,2,… ,ℓ} {|𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗|} , |𝑦𝑦ℓ+1
′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 | , … , |𝑦𝑦
ℓ′
′𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗| }  if  ℓ < ℓ′.
In the same way, the distance between consumption plans 𝑥 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑥 ′𝑎𝑖 for 
every 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ≝ {1,2, … , 𝑚 𝑎𝑥 {𝑚 ,𝑚 ′}} is defined.
On the basis of the above, we define the index which helps to compare 
the innovativeness of different transformations of the initial economy. 
Following Schumpeterian thinking, we assume that both: the initial and final 
economies are the Debreu economies (ℇ
𝑞
 =  ℇ
𝑝 
 ,ℇ
𝑞
′ =  ℇ
𝑝 
′) as well as ℇ
𝑝 
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑝 
′. 
Let ((𝑥 𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ,𝑝 ) and ((𝑥 ′𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦′𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ,𝑝 ′) be states of equilibrium in 
the economies, adequately ℇ
𝑝 
 and  ℇ
𝑝 
′.
The distance between two states is equal: 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 (((𝑥 𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
); ((𝑥 ′𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦′𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
)) ≝ 
𝑚 𝑎𝑥 {𝑚 𝑎𝑥 {𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ ; 𝑦′𝑏𝑗∗):  𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 }; 𝑚 𝑎𝑥 {𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑥 𝑎𝑖∗ ;𝑥 ′𝑎𝑖∗):  𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 }}
The number (7) is called the index of innovativeness of the economy ℇ
𝑞
′ with 
the realized allocation ((𝑥 ′𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦′𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
).  It measures the highest difference 
between the quantities of commodities in the agents’ plans of actions in times 
𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 1. Consequently, the above defined index of innovativeness shows 
the biggest change introduced to the economy under study on the given time 
interval. Let us emphasize that the level of the index of innovativeness of the 
economy ℇ
𝑝 
′ depends not only on the initial economy but also on the realized 
allocation. If the designer of economic activity aims at inducing or increasing 
the innovative activities on market, then he will intend to establish the state 
of equilibrium with the higher level of the index of innovativeness rather than 
with the smaller one, especially if the innovators are better off (see (3)) in the 
economy ℇ
𝑝 
′ than in the initial economy ℇ
p
.
It may happen that in the final economy ℇ
𝑝 
′ there are at least two 
different states of equilibrium with the same index of innovativeness. Then 
it seems to be “very Schumpeterian” that the designer will tend to establish 
a “better” state of equilibrium. This is the problem under study in the next 
part of the paper. 
Comparative analysis of mechanisms of equilibrium in the Debreu economy 
As was emphasized earlier, the final stage of Schumpeterian economic 
development is moving the system to a new stationary state, where previous 
(7)
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI), 
Volume 14, Issue 1, 2018: 7-28 
 23 Agnieszka Lipieta and Andrzej Malawski /
innovations have been absorbed in the equilibrated system (see for instance 
Andersen, 2009). If, for some 𝑠 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑆}, ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′ (𝑡 
𝑠
) where ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 
𝑠
) is the 
Debreu economy, then at time 𝑡 
𝑠
 , the adapting mechanisms will start working 
in the economy ℇ
𝑞
′(𝑡 
𝑠
) until any producer does not change his activity on the 
market. If any producer introduces innovative changes, then it means that 
innovative evolution of economy ℇ
𝑞
 is still working. The innovative evolution 
will be stopped when every producer will be satisfied with his profit and the 
consumers will adopt the innovations into consumptions plans. Hence if ℇ
𝑞
⊂
𝑖
 
ℇ
𝑞
′ and the producers do not change their plans of action as well as ℇ
𝑞
′ is the 
Debreu economy (ℇ
𝑞
′ =  ℇ
𝑝 
′), the adopting procedures start working. 
Now we face a challenge to model the second type of mechanism whose 
output is a state of equilibrium in the given economy. This type of mechanism 
was defined in Lipieta (2013) but for an economy with a finite number of 
agents. The following theorem is proved in the same way as Theorem 4. 1 in 
Lipieta (2013). 
Theorem 4. Let ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃,𝐶,𝜃,𝜔) be the Debreu economy and
𝑍 = {((𝑥 𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
):  ∃𝑝 ∈ ℝℓ ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ,𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 𝑥 𝑎∗ ∈𝜑𝑎(𝑝 ) ,𝑦𝑏∗ ∈ 𝜂𝑏(𝑝 )
∧∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
𝑥 𝑎∗ − ∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝑦𝑏∗ =  𝜔}. 
If the set 𝑍 is not empty, then the components of economy ℇ
𝑝 
 form the 
economic mechanism with 𝑍  as the set of outcomes. 
 
Proof. Let 𝐾 = {𝑎
1
 ,𝑏
1
 ,𝑎
2
 ,𝑏
2
 ,…} be the set of agents. The environment of agent 
𝑘 ∈𝐾  is of the form (5), the set of environments 𝐸 𝑘  of every agent 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  as well 
as the set of environments 𝐸  are of the form (6). Define 
 • 𝑀 = {m = (𝑝 ,𝑥 𝑎¹ ,𝑦𝑏¹ ,𝑥 𝑎2 ,𝑦𝑏2 ,…)∈ ℝℓ × 𝑋𝑎¹ × 𝑌𝑏¹ ×…∶  
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∞
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔},    
 • 𝜇(𝑒) =  𝜇(𝑒𝑎¹ ,𝑒𝑏¹ ,𝑒𝑎2 ,𝑒𝑏2 ,…) ≝ ⋂
𝑘 ∈𝐾 
 𝜇𝑘 (𝑒𝑘 ) where 
𝜇𝑘 :  𝐸 𝑘  → 𝑀 is the message correspondence of agent 𝑘 ∈𝐾 such that
𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘(𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘) ≝ {
{m ∈ 𝑀𝑀: 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝)} 
{m ∈ 𝑀𝑀: 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝)}
{m ∈ 𝑀𝑀: 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘), 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝) ∧ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝)} 
 
for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐵𝐵\𝐴𝐴
for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝐴\𝐵𝐵
for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵,
 • ℎ:  𝑀 → 𝑍 , ℎ(𝑝 , 𝑥 𝑎¹, 𝑦𝑏¹, 𝑥 𝑎2 ,𝑦𝑏2 ,… ) ≝ (𝑥 𝑎¹ , … , 𝑥 𝑎𝑚 , 𝑦𝑏¹ , … , 𝑦𝑏𝑛 ). 
By the above definitions, we immediately get that the structure 𝛤 = (𝑀,𝜇,ℎ), is 
the price mechanism realizing the goal correspondence 
𝐹: 𝐸 ∋ (𝑒𝑘 ¹ ,𝑒𝑘 2 , …) → (𝑥 𝑎¹∗ , … , 𝑥 𝑎𝑚 ∗ , 𝑦𝑏¹∗, … , 𝑦𝑏𝑛 ∗) ∈ 𝑍 
The mechanism defined in Theorem 4 will be called the mechanism of 
equilibrium in economy ℇ
𝑝 
 or the adopting mechanism. As we see, if there 
is equilibrium in the given Debreu economy, then comparing mechanisms 
of equilibrium in this economy refers to comparing its feasible states of 
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equilibrium in this economy, which are the output of some mechanism of 
Schumpeterian evolution studied earlier. 
DISCUSSION 
Let ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ, 𝑃
𝑞
, 𝐶
𝑞
, 𝜃, 𝜔) be the Debreu economy where two states of 
equilibrium (see (2)) are feasible, namely 
𝑅 ̃ ≝ ((𝑥 ̃𝑎∗)
𝑎∈𝐴 
 ,(𝑦̃𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ,𝑝 ̃) and 𝑅 ̃ ≝ ((𝑥 ̃𝑎∗)
 𝑎∈𝐴 
,(𝑦̃𝑏∗)
𝑏∈𝐵 
 ,𝑝 ̃). 
Now the problem under study is to define a criterion to enable comparing 
these two sequences in the context of improving positions of the economic 
agents taking part in the market activities in the meaning of conditions (3) 
and (4) or under improvement of the position of the economy as a whole. 
The term: improvement of the position of the economy will be defined later. 
First, some basic properties of states of equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium 
in the private ownership economy will be presented. Assume first that 𝑝  ̃   = 𝑝 . 
Then 
𝑥 𝑎𝑖∗ ∼
𝑖
 𝑥 ̃𝑎𝑖∗ for every 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝑚 } and 𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ =  𝑝 ̃ ∘ 𝑦̃𝑏𝑗∗ for every 𝑗 ∈ {1,…,𝑛 }. 
It means that the positions of every economic agent in the sense of conditions 
(3) and (4) are not changed. If 𝑝 ̃= 𝑘 ∙ 𝑝 for 𝑘 > 1, then also 
𝑥 𝑎𝑖∗ ∼
𝑖
 𝑥 ̃𝑎𝑖∗ for every 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝑚 }
but 
𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ > 0 ⟹ 𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ < 𝑝 ̃ ∘ 𝑦̃𝑏𝑗∗ for every 𝑗 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛 }
as well as 
𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ < 0 ⟹ 𝑝 ∘ 𝑦𝑏𝑗∗ > 𝑝 ̃ ∘ 𝑦̃𝑏𝑗∗ for every 𝑗 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛 }
As we see, if the prices are proportionally higher in the sequence 𝑅 ̃ than in 
sequence 𝑅 (see (8)) then some economic agents can be better off (see (3)) 
while some of them can be worse off in the state of economy of the form 
𝑅 ̃ in comparing to the state 𝑅. The same can appear if vectors ?̃?  and 𝑝  are 
diametrically different. So, in many cases, the positions of some economic 
agents are improved while some of them not. 
By this reason, we focus on ordering the feasible states of equilibrium in 
the Debreu economy under the other criterion. Let ℇ
𝑝 
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃
𝑞
 ,𝐶
𝑞
 ,𝜃,𝜔) be the 
Debreu economy where two states of equilibrium: 𝑅 and 𝑅 ̃ , are feasible (see 
(2)). Notice firstly that 
𝑝 ∘ (∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
𝑥 𝑎∗) =  𝑝 ∘ 𝜔 + (𝑝 ∘ ∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
 𝑦𝑏∗). (9)
(8)
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The number 
𝑤 ≝ 𝑝 ∘  (∑
𝑎∈𝐴 
 𝑥 𝑎∗)
can be interpreted as the total wealth of economy ℇ
𝑝 
 at state 𝑅 (see (8)), 
while the number 
𝑊 = 𝑤 − 𝑝  ∘ 𝜔
is the increment of the total wealth of the economy ℇ
𝑝 
 at state 𝑅. We can say 
that Debreu economy ℇ
𝑝 
 improved its position at state 𝑅 if 𝑊 > 0. 
 
The increment of the total wealth of the economy ℇ
𝑝 
 can be obtained, among 
others, by activity of innovators on the market. 
Analogously, we define numbers ?̃? and 𝑊  ̃  at state 𝑅 ̃ (see (8), (10) and 
(11)). By (9) we get that if 
𝑝 ∘ ∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
𝑦𝑏∗ > 𝑝 ̃ ∘ ∑
𝑏∈𝐵 
 𝑦̃𝑏∗ ⟹ 𝑊 > 𝑊 
On the basis of property (12) we say that the state 𝑅  ̃ is more beneficial (more 
preferable) for economy ℇ
𝑝 
 than state 𝑅, shortly 𝑅 ≺ 𝑅 ̃ , if and only if increment 
of the total wealth of that economy at state 𝑅 ̃ is higher than at state 𝑅, formally 
𝑅 ≺ 𝑅 ̃    ⟺ 𝑊 < 𝑊  ̃   . 
Hence if 𝑅, 𝑅 ̃  are two feasible states of equilibrium in economy ℇ
𝑝 
 (see (8)) 
and 𝑅 ≺ 𝑅 ̃ , then the designer of economic activity in economy ℇ
𝑝 
 should make 
producers and consumers realize their optimal plans from sequence 𝑅 ̃rather 
than from sequence 𝑅. Recall that innovators realize their innovative plans 
and that is why they are elements of the sequence adequately 𝑅 or 𝑅 ̃  (see 
(8)). Hence the sufficiently large number of innovators allows, in many cases, 
for the gain of an increment of the total wealth of the Debreu economy at a 
possibly high level. 
Analogously, we say that states 𝑅̃  and 𝑅 are equally beneficial (indifferent), 
in short 𝑅 ̃ ∼𝑅, if the increments of the total wealth of that economy at state 
𝑅 and at state 𝑅  ̃ are equal, precisely
𝑅 ̃ ∼𝑅 ⟺ 𝑊 =  𝑊  ̃   . 
On the basis of the above, we say that state 𝑅 ̃ is at least preferred as state 𝑅 
if it is more beneficial or indifferent. Formally, 
𝑅 ≼ ?̃? ⟺ 𝑅 ≺ ?̃?  ∨ 𝑅 ∼ ?̃? 
It is easy to check that relation ≼ ⊂ (ℝℓ)2(𝑚 +𝑛 +1) is reflexive, transitive and 
complete. Hence the relation defined in (13) is the preference relation in the 
set of all feasible states of equilibrium of economy ℇ
𝑝 
.
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
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Let ℇ
p
 =  (ℝℓ ,𝑃, 𝐶, 𝜃, 𝜔) and ℇ     ̃ 
p
=  (ℝℓ, ?̃?, 𝐶 ̃ , 𝜃, 𝜔) be two Debreu economies 
different only in price system. Let  ≺ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊 ,     ∼ ̃ ⟺  𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊
 ≼ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊.
 and  ≺ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊 ,     ∼ ̃ ⟺  𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊
 ≼ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊.
 be the mechanisms of equilibrium 
respectively in economies ℇ
p 
and    
Taking all the above into consideration we define 
 ≺ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊 ,     ∼ ̃ ⟺  𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊
 ≼ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊.and consequently 
Let
 ≺ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊 ,     ∼ ̃ ⟺  𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊
 ≼ ̃ ⟺ 𝑊𝑊 𝑊 ?̃?𝑊.
:
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ℇ𝑞𝑞 = (ℝ
ℓ, 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞, 𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞, 𝜃𝜃, 𝜃𝜃𝜃, ℇ𝑞𝑞′ = (ℝℓ
′
, 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞
′, 𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
′ , 𝜃𝜃′, 𝜃𝜃′𝜃, ℇ̃𝑞𝑞′ = (ℝℓ
′
, ?̃?𝑃𝑞𝑞
′, ?̃?𝐶𝑞𝑞
′ , 𝜃𝜃′, 𝜃𝜃′𝜃
be the Debreu economies and ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ𝑞𝑞′  and ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ̃𝑞𝑞′  on time interval 
[0,1]. We can implement the results of that part of the paper to the 
economies ℇ𝑞𝑞′  and ℇ̃𝑞𝑞′ . On the basis of the above results, the designer can 
order the adopting mechanisms in the set of possible economies ℇ𝑞𝑞′  for 
which  ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ𝑞𝑞′ , which differ only in price system, formally in the set: 
𝔼𝔼𝑞𝑞(ℇ𝑞𝑞; ℇ𝑞𝑞
′ 𝜃 ≝
 {ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′ ∈ 𝔼𝔼𝑞𝑞: ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′  ∧  ℇ𝑞𝑞
′  and ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′   differ only in price system}. 
The internal structure of this domain can be the research object of the 
future studies. 
be the Debreu economies and ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′ and ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ ̃ 
𝑞
′ on time interval [0,1]. We 
can implement the results of that part of the paper to the economies ℇ
𝑞
′ and 
ℇ ̃ 
𝑞
′. On the basis of the above results, the designer can order the adopting 
mechanisms in the set of possible economies ℇ
𝑞
′ for which ℇ
𝑞
 ⊂
𝑖
 ℇ
𝑞
′, which 
differ only in price system, formally in the set: 
𝔼
𝑞
 (ℇ
𝑞
 ;ℇ
𝑞
′ ) ≝ 
2 
𝑞𝑞 𝑞𝑞
56. Str 25, linia 3 od dołu - przesunięty wężyk w 3 miejscach; jest: „{ℇ𝑞𝑞′
~
∈ 𝔼𝔼𝑞𝑞: ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ𝑞𝑞
′ ~  ∧  ℇ𝑞𝑞
′  and ℇ𝑞𝑞
′ ~”, 
powinno być: {ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′ ∈ 𝔼𝔼𝑞𝑞: ℇ𝑞𝑞 ⊂𝑖𝑖 ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′  ∧  ℇ𝑞𝑞
′  and ℇ̃𝑞𝑞
′ .
57. Str 27, linia 6 – brak nawiasu, przy określeniu numerów stron.
58. Str 27, linia 11 od dołu – złe rozdzielenie wyrazu na sylaby.
 differ only in price system}. 
The internal structure of this domain can b  the research bject of the future 
studies.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to some neo-Schumpeterian studies, where two kinds of 
mechanisms in the framework of Schumpeterian evolution, namely the 
innovative evolution mechanism as well as the adopting mechanism were 
only indicated and considered verbally, we distinguished and modeled them 
in a general and rigorous manner. Moreover, some of these mechanisms 
appear to be qualitative ones, which reveal their complex structure and 
can be a promising starting point for further analysis of these types of 
mechanisms. We have also precisely explained the motivations of innovators 
and the reason for which the innovations are adopted into the producers’ 
and consumers’ plans of action and, in consequence, their influence on the 
components of states of equilibrium. 
The criteria for comparing the two types of modeled mechanisms, based 
on some properties of the adequate set of outcomes, also were presented. 
They enable, among others, the measurement of the innovativeness of the 
processes under study, as well as the comparison of the feasible states of 
equilibrium in the modified economies. All this can be the basis for further 
research. Especially, the role of market leaders in the evolutionary processes 
seems to be worth studying as well as examining the “best” or at least the 
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“good enough” mechanisms among the mechanisms presented in the paper, 
from the point of view of designers, consumers or innovators, respectively. 
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Abstrakt
Niniejszy artykuł powstał w ramach programu badawczego dotyczącego modelowania 
wizji rozwoju innowacyjnego Schumpetera w aparacie pojęciowym teorii ogólnej 
równowagi Arrowa-Debreu. Aby analizować zmiany w sferze produkcji oraz całej gospo-
darce wykorzystano pojęcie rozszerzenia systemu ekonomicznego oraz jego podsystem-
ów, co umożliwiło modelowanie schumpeterowskich mechanizmów ewolucji gospodarki, 
w ujęciu teorii mechanizmów ekonomicznych Hurwicza. 
Celem artykułu jest rozszerzenie naszych poprzednich badań w dwu nowych ki-
erunkach. Po pierwsze określimy warunki wystarczające do poprawy sytuacji ekonom-
icznej różnych grup podmiotów, takich jak producenci, innowatorzy, konsumenci etc., 
w wyniku działania mechanizmu cenowego lub jakościowego. Po drugie, aby porównywać 
mechanizmy schumpeterowskiej ewolucji, odwołujemy się do logiki procesu, zdetermi-
nowanego przez zmiany innowacyjne lub zmiany adaptujące zmierzające do równowagi, 
co prowadzi do sformułowania dwóch różnych kryteriów, opartych z jednej strony na 
współczynniku odległości pomiędzy dwoma rozszerzeniami innowacyjnymi, z drugiej st-
rony na współczynniku zamożności rozważanych grup podmiotów. 
W artykule analizowane są również motywacje wprowadzania innowacji przez firmy 
oraz powody dla których innowacje są adoptowane do rutynowych działań producentów 
i konsumentów. Wyniki naszych teoretycznych rozważań mogą być przydatne w analizach 
rynkowych m. in. w przypadku braku wystarczającego dostępu do danych statystycznych. 
Z uwagi na formalny charakter zarówno teorii ogólnej równowagi jak i podejścia Hur-
wicza do problemu projektowania mechanizmów ekonomicznych, główne rezultaty 
mają postać twierdzeń matematycznych interpretowanych w języku ekonomii. 
Słowa kluczowe: ewolucja Schumpetera, mechanizmy, mechanizmy projektowania, 
gospodarka Debreu. 
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